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TORTS
TORTS-Products Liability: Duty to Warn
A person who may be hypersensitive to an ingredient in
a product generally has no action against a manufacturer for
failure to warn of the possible dangers in the use of his
product.1 However, in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish,2 it was
held that a manufacturer of prescription drugs was liable
for an injury to a hypersensitive arthritic patient. The manu-
facturer's liability was based on the failure to warn the
plaintiff's doctor of the drug's rare side effects on hypersen-
sitive or idiosyncratic patients. The manufacturer argued
that the duty to warn did not extend to those few individ-
uals who are injured because of their own unusual hyper-
sensitivity to a product. It was asserted that the unforesee-
ability of the injury and the futility of a warning should
deny any relief to the injured party. The manufacturer con-
sidered it unreasonable to expect him to foresee that some
few persons among his many customers would suffer an
allergic reaction to an ingredient in his product.3 "In an
action by the buyer or user of a product, based on negligence,
against the manufacturer, jobber, or seller, for damages re-
sulting after the use of the product, it has been held that
there is no liability upon the manufacturer, jobber, or seller,
where the buyer was allergic or unusually susceptible to
injury from the product."4 Consequently, the manufacturer
considered the allergy or the unusual susceptibility of the
person to be the cause of the injury. In addition, it was
urged that a warning given on a retail package would be
effective only if the purchaser knew in advance of his allergy.
The court readily distinguished the facts of the Sterling
Drug case from the non-prescriptive retail product cases cited
by the manufacturer. The court believed that there was suf-
1 Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959).
2 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
3 Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959).
4 100 N.W.2d at 8. Nrorthweern Uriversiry
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ficient evidence for the jury to find that the manufacturer
knew that some persons could be injured by the drug's side
effect. The court pointed out that the case concerned a
prescription drug rather than a commercial product. If the
doctor had been properly warned of the possibility of a
side effect in some patients and advised of the symptoms
normally accompanying the side effect, there would be an
excellent chance that injury to the patient could have been
avoided. The plaintiff's doctor would have been a knowledge-
able intermediary between the patient and the manufacturer.
Following the 1842 English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright,5 there developed a general rule of non-liability to
consumers or users of a product where they were not in
contractual privity with the manufacturer. Although various
reasons were given in support of the rule requiring privity,
the main reason was that a manufacturer ordinarily could
not foresee or anticipate injury to anyone other than his
immediate purchaser.
By 1903, the courts had developed at least three excep-
tions to the rule of non-liability of manufacturers to third
persons. These exceptions were set out in the leading case
of Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co.6 as follows:
1. defendant was liable where the product was known
to be imminently dangerous and he failed to disclose
that fact to the buyer;
2. where, irrespective of contract, defendant furnished
a defective product on his premises for plaintiff-
invitee's use; and
3. where defendant was negligent in the manufacture
or sale of an imminently dangerous product intended
to preserve, destroy, or affect human life.
Generally, food products, beverages, drugs, firearms and
explosives fall within the last and most important category.
Since the Huset case, the law has recognized the duty of
5 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
6 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903).
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the manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumer of any
dangers known to him in the normal use of the product.
If a manufacturer in the exercise of reasonable care
ought to have known of a hidden danger, MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.7 would dictate liability for a failure to
warn. However, when only those with personal idiosyncrasies
suffer harm, the liability of the manufacturer is not always
susceptible to easy determination.
The paramount question is whether the cause of the
injury was due to an allergy of the consumer or to a defect
in the product. A minority of the jurisdictions have held
that the allergy itself is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury.8 This is a superficial approach. It determines liability
on the basis of a mathematical computation derived from
clinical studies of the allergy instead of an inquiry into duty,
knowledge, and foreseeability.9
In allergy cases, as in other actions by an ultimate con-
sumer against the manufacturer, the plaintiff may seek re-
covery either for breach of an implied warranty or for
negligence. A majority of the courts hold that an implied
warranty extends only to an anticipated use by a normal
consumer and deny that a manufacturer is liable to a hyper-
allergic consumer.l0 Should the percentage of users suffer-
7 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); See Carter v. Yardley &
Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) which specifically
adopted the MacPherson rule to allergy cases but is based
on the inference that the plaintiff is normal.
8 -.. [T]he cause of appellee's injury was the idiosyncracy of
her skin . . . .", Walstron Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d
895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Merrill v. Beaute Vues
Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956) (dictum); accord,
Hamilton v. Harris, 204 S.W. 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
9 Comment, Liability of Manufacturer or Vendor to an
Allergic Consumer, 49 MciH. L. REV. 253, 254-56 (1950).
10 See, e.g., Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 898
(10th Cir. 1956); Cumberland v. Household Research Corp.,
145 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Mass. 1956); Stanton v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1942).
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ing an adverse reaction to the product become substantial, an
implied warranty of fitness has been held to protect them.11
If the plaintiff charges the defendant manufacturer with a
negligent failure to warn of the possibilities of an allergic
reaction, the question of foreseeability becomes the crux
of the problem.12 Almost any product may cause an adverse
reaction to a consumer, but a mere possibility of injury has
not been held sufficient to hold a manufacturer liable. Pres-
ent decisions indicate there must also exist a probability.13
Certain cases in the field of negligence have definitely
enlarged the scope of duty to warn. One such case involved
injuries claimed to have been'caused by hair dye.14 The
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff even though the defendant had given the
standard warning prescribed by the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetics Act for coal tar hair dye--"Caution - This Product
Contains Ingredients Which May Cause Skin Irritations On
Certain Individuals And A Preliminary Test According To
Accompanying Directions Should First Be Made."15 The
plaintiff made the prescribed test, with no reaction, before
her first use of the dye. It was not clear whether the instruc-
tions directed patch tests in addition to the initial one. In any
event it appeared that repeated tests, while they might have
revealed a local or skin sensitivity, would not have indicated
the plaintiff's type of "toxic systemic allergic reaction." Con-
sequently, the plaintiff claimed that the warning given was
insufficient with respect to the plaintiff's systemic reaction
which resulted from the continued use of the dye.
11 Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1939).
12 Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48,
53 (1913).
13 "The law requires a person to reasonably guard against
probabilities, not possibilities." Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp.,
235 F.2d. 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1956).
14 Braun v Roux Distributing Co., Inc., 312 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo.
Sup. Ct. 1958).
15 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 361 (a) (1958).
[V'ol. 5, No. I
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In spite of the fact that no previous injury of this sort
had occurred, the court sustained a finding by the jury that
the defendant "knew, or by the exercise of due care should
have known," of the risk of systemic injury; and that the
defendant should have given a more adequate warning. The
finding of a duty to warn obviously could not have been
based on any statistical frequency for this type of injury
since it was the first case of its kind. The duty was based
on the concept of expert knowledge. The court emphasized
the obligation of the defendant to keep reasonably abreast of
scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning the field.
Therefore, in Braun v. Roux Distributing Co., Inc.,16 there
was an adequate warning with respect to the less serious
allergies. The negligence alleged was a failure to warn of
the grave systemic allergy to which the plaintiff was sus-
ceptible. In substance, the Missouri court appeared to be
imposing strict liability on the manufacturer.
A fundamental objection to imposing q, duty to warn
on manufacturers or vendors is that it would be a rare case
where the failure to warn would be the cause of the plaintiff's
injury. Even if the plaintiff read the warning, it is unlikely
that he would refrain from using the product unless he knew
he was allergic to one of its ingredients. If the consumer
has knowledge of an allergy, he is not likely to use a new
product without first obtaining the advice of a physician.
To answer that causation is simply a question of evi-
dence does not solve the fundamental objection. The plaintiff
might testify that he would not have used the product had
it displayed a warning. He might, of course, be telling the
truth; but it is quite likely that the plaintiff would recover
even though a causal relation was lacking. Although the
failure to warn would be negligence, the absence of a causal
relation would often make the manufacturer an insurer of
his product.
16 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958).
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